The Information Technology (IT) revolution, combined with people's need to access information quickly, has resulted in the explosive growth of the Intemet in the past decade. Ubiquitous access to the Intemet has become an essential component of a mobile workforce and multiple mechanisms are being devised to ensure seamless connectivity to corporate resources. An integrated security framework requires a careful consideration of the security features of the network within an airplane. Potentially, the aircraft could consist of three kinds of networks namely passenger network, crew network, and control network. The security protocol implemented must ensure a proper separation of these networks and also watch for any security protocol violations. In this paper, the authors review the existing aircraft data network standards, security provisioning, and the security threats associated with the aircraft data networks. In addition, the authors also analyze the security threats associated with different network architectures.
Communication networks within the airplanes bring out a lot of new possibilities. Along with providing Intemet access to the passengers, the communication network could also be used to enhance flight safety and flight control. Some airline manufacturers have gone one step further and are planning to use data networks to connect the flight components [I] . While this enables an easier control system, it involves some possible security and safety issues.
In this paper, the authors review the existing standards related to aircraft data networks, the security requirements and the security threats. The authors also explore the security issues associated with various network architectures that could possibly be used in aircraft data networks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 11, the authors review the various research efforts carried out in this area. In Section 111, the authors discuss the security requirements of aircraft data networks. In Section IV, the authors present a discussion of network architecture in view of aircraft security. In Section V, the authors present the proposed security extensions to accommodate quality of service issues associated with aircraft data networks. In the last Section (Section VI), the authors present their conclusions.
RELATED WORK
Since the early 1970s, data networks were playing an important role in avionics. In the primitive stage, an aircraft consisted of federated systems (defined by ARINC 429 [6] standard) where each flight component was operating with its own set of softwarehardware components. Different flight components were connected using point-to-point links. While this implementation was functional, it had limitations in terms of available bandwidth and the number of connections to be made, as most of the connections were point-to-point (rarely point-to-multipoint). In addition, ARINC 429 was incompatible with commercial off-theshelf (COTS) equipment. As the need for bandwidth and data dependency between different flight components grew, the aircraft industry was compelled to adopt new ways of connecting these different components.
In the early 1990s, integrated subsystem (ARINC 629) was introduced in aircrafts [6] . In the integrated subsystem, some Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) were connected to a common data bus. However, different modules were still connected using the ARINC 429 standard. One of the main improvements that ARINC 629 achieved was in terms of redundancy requirements. While ARINC 429 required component level redundancy, ARINC 629 improved it by defining module level redundancy. It was observed that ARINC 629 was expensive tu implement, and, also, that it was incompatible with COTS equipment such as ARINC 429. In addition, it was also observed that integrated subsystems were effective only for small amounts of data transfer. This led to the development of the ARINC 664 standard that defines total system integration.
The main purpose of ARINC 664 was to identify commercial standards that could be used in avionics with little or no modifications. One of the main goals of ARINC 664 was to establish a connection between various networks that could be situated within an airbome airplane. It started off with IEEE 802. The commercial standards adopted within ARINC 664 enable multiple networks with different characteristics to coexist within the airplane. In addition, ARINC 664 also enables the use of COTS equipment in the design. The ARINC 664 standard broadly divides the networks within the airplane into four different groups (flight deck, OEM, airline, and passenger networks) based on their requirements. The distinction is mainly based on their determinism requirements.
Part 5 of ARINC 664 standard addresses the security issues associated with aircraft data networks. It specifies using IPSec based encryption, key exchange, and authentication schemes to ensure network security. In addition to using cryptographic methods, the standard also suggests using packet filters, application level proxies and circuit level gateways to ensure security within the airplane.
In addition to the ARINC 664 standard suit, there are some additional standards that are generally used while designing an aircraft network. ARINC 628 defines the cabin equipment interfaces. ARINC 746 defines the Cabin Communication Systems. The Aviation Satellite Communications System is defined in ARINC 761, and the network server system is defined in ARINC 763. The network architecture and components used to design an aircraft network should comply with all the above standards and meet the safety and security requirements.
Along with ARINC standards, there are various other research publications that discussed the aviation security requirements. Most of these publications revolve around application security and IPSec based encryption mechanism to improve security. However, in aviation data networks, the security should be considered with a different perspective. As stated in ARINC 664-part 5, the network security (security of the network layer including the link layer) is more important than the application security.
In this paper, the authors concentrate more on the network security aspect of the aviation data networks. In the next Section, the authors discuss the various security issues associated with the aviation data networks.
AVIATION SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
Along with safety, the avionics subsystem must also possess sufficient security provisioning for a successful deployment. In a recent report, the US General Accounting Office has wamed that while the extent and effects of cyber terrorism on US infrastructure is yet to he determined, aviation and other key infrastructure installations are highly vulnerable because of their indivisibility from global communication [5] . Adoption of open standards for data networks has further increased the security concems. In addition, care must be taken about security requirements while achieving interoperability between various systems within the airplane.
In any network system, there are three basic security requirements that need to be addressed. They are confidentiality, authentication and integrity. Data confidentiality ensures the privacy of the end users and protects their data from spoofing. Similarly data integrity ensures that the data sent by the end user is not modified by any malicious element in the network. Authentication is one of the most important factors in network security as it controls access to the network resources. Authentication ensures that only valid users have access to the network resources.
In addition to the above requirements, an airplane network needs additional security in terms of separation between various network segments. The control network has to be protected from unauthorized access. This requires the control network to be separated from the passenger network. Also the passenger network resource usage needs to be monitored and controlled (if necessary). This requires the passenger network to be connected to a gateway that performs both the monitoring and controlling function in addition to providing Internet access.
Security Issues
The security issues involved with airplane network can be broadly classified into two categories: external and internal.
The external security issues are mostly related to the external link connecting the airplane network with the ground station and to the protocol used to provide mobility support. The airplane network could be connected to the ground station by either satellite links or wireless links, depending on the location of the airplane. While the airplane is airborne, it could use either a satellite link or terrestrial link to connect to the ground station. If the airplane is within the range of a wireless access point, it could even use wireless media to connect to the external world. Each of these media has security issues associated with it. Recent studies [7 and 81 have shown that IF' over satellite link is not very secure and have suggested using encryption (preferably IPSec encryption) in order to protect data. Similarly, wireless networks are also prone to security threats. There have been a lot of research efforts to improve the security of wireless links. Wired equivalent privacy (WEP) [9] is one of the most widely used security mechanisms for wireless networks.
Along with addressing the security concerns of the extemal links, these security protocols also address the security issues related to the mobility support protocol. Mobile IF' [IO and 1 I] , one of the most widely accepted mobility support protocols, does not define any security mechanisms to protect mobile device data. Many researchers have suggested using IF'Sec encryption along with Mobile IF' [I2 and 131 to achieve data security. In addition, IF'Sec could also be used for authentication purposes.
Compared to the external threats, there are more severe security threats that could be originating from within the airplane. With the co-existence of the passenger and control networks, the control network could be exposed to attacks from the passenger network. The attack could be in the form of Denial of Service [ 141 or it could also be an access violation. Any security breach with the control network could cause severe damage to the flight safety. Hence, it is very important that the network architecture design should provide a proper separation between the control network and the passenger network.
architectures within the aircraft, and their properties, are discussed.
Avionics Subsystem Design
The main requirements of the avionics subsystem are high determinism and a low response time. Different layer 2 technologies like Ethemet, ATM, Fibre Channel and InfiniBand could be considered to provide such a high determinism and low response time. Ethemet is one of the strongest contenders for connections between various flight sub systems and is also mentioned in ARINC 664 standard.
The wide usage of Ethernet, COTS components, equipment and software availability, and its independence from network topology makes it a most attractive choice. However in a recent study [I51 conducted to compare Fibre channel, ATM, and Ethernet technologies, it was demonstrated that ATM might be a better choice over the other two as it could be used in local area as well as wide area networks. In addition, ATM can also work over satellite links which makes it more flexible. However, another study conducted by the author of [I61 indicated that InfiniBand might be the best fit for future avionics communications. InfiniBand reduces the processing complexity of the computer processing system in addition to providing high bandwidth. InfiniBand switch fabric also provides both partitioning and QoS at each switch port to manage performance levels.
Avionics Data Network Design
Security and quality of service are the two important parameters that need to be considered while designing the aviation data networks. The quality of service here does not reflect the quality of service requirements of the end-user applications, but it represents the requirements of the avionics subsystem itself.
One of the major security requirements of aviation data networks is the separation of different network subsystems. An aviation data network could possibly contain three major network segments namely a control network, crew network, and passenger network. As the names suggest, the control network predominantly consists of avionics components. The crew network is used by the flight crew for monitoring purposes, and the passenger network enables internet connectivity for the passengers.
IV. NETWORK ARCHITECTURE
In order to protect the control network from unauthorized access and security attacks, it is necessary that the control network is separated from rest of the aviation data networks. The separation can either be
In the previous section, the authors have presented various security issues involved with aircraft data network design. In this section, some possible network or physical.
In the case of logical separation, the control network, the crew network, and the passenger network could all be connected to the same Ethemet switch as shown in Figure 1 . The three networks are separated using VLANs. While VLANs provide a very basic form of security for individual network segments, they are prone to security attacks [17] . The most common attacks experienced by the VLANs are listed below: 
MAC Flooding Attack
Each switch has a limited amount of memory to hold the identities of the devices connected to it. When the memory becomes full, the new addresses will not be stored and the packets belonging to these new addresses will be flooded. An attacker could use this weakness to turn the switch into a dumb pseudo hub and sniff the traffic flowing through the switch. In the case of physical separation, the control network the crew network, and the passenger network are configured as three separate mobile networks. The mobile router providing extemal world connectivity will have multiple interfaces, one for each network type. The network configuration is as shown in Figure 2 .
802.lQ and ISL
The physical separation provides better security as compared to the VLAN based connectivity. This is because of the fact that the networks are separated by a router. This reduces the possibility of any sniffing or eavesdropping. In addition, the router can also be configured as an additional firewall to stop all unwanted traffic from entering into the control network. While physical separation ensures a higher level of protection for the control network, it does not protect the control network from other security risks. The control network will still be prone to DOS attacks and unauthorized access attacks. These could be addressed by deploying a suitable firewall, as stated in the ARINC 664 standard. standard also mentions the usage of packet filters placed in strategic locations to further protect the aviation data network from extemalhntemal attacks. In addition to these proxy servers and packet filters, using a dedicated network activity monitoringlcontrolling server would help in improving the security.
The network activity monitoringlcontrolling server could be built in line with an intrusion detection system (IDS). However, unlike normal IDS, the network activity monitoringlcontrolling server can make decisions based on the data feed from many sources including the cabin voice recorder and surveillance equipment placed at strategic locations within the flight. The server could potentially control all the active forwarding devices. Depending upon the network activity and the security status of the aviation data network, the server can reconfigure the active devices and facilitate control network trafic during emergency situations.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Data network enabled aircrafts have opened up a new set of service opportunities. At the same time, they have also introduced several security threats that need to be addressed. These security threats can originate from outside the airplane or from within the plane. Using encryption mechanisms could address the security concems related to extemal attacks. However, intemal security threats could be addressed only by choosing proper network architecture. In this paper, the authors analyzed the drawbacks of using switched VLANS for connecting various network segments within the aviation data networks. The authors suggest using physical separation rather than logical separation to connect different network segments. In addition, the authors also suggested using a network activity monitoring tool that could also control all active connecting devices and facilitate a safe and secure communication.
